报告题目：Behavior-Based Pricing in Congestion-Prone Systems with Delay Commitment

报 告 人：王钟彬 副教授, 国家优秀青年基金获得者

工作单位：天津大学

报告时间：2023-11-29  19:00-21:00；

报告地点：腾讯会议：314-734-232

报告摘要：

Problem definition: Recent years have witnessed the widespread use of data to recognize repeat and new consumers to offer them different prices, i.e., behavior-based pricing (BBP). While extant research has explored the impacts of BBP on the market, the majority of this research neglects the consequential congestion effect arising from a surge in demand. This study contributes to the literature by delving into the repercussions of BBP in congestion-prone systems, with a specific focus on investigating the impact of delay on both platforms and consumers. Methodology/results: Using a two-period dynamic game-theoretic duopoly model integrated with a queueing system, where service qualities are adjusted in each period, our analysis reveals that BBP consistently exacerbates platform outcomes while benefiting the consumer population. To restore the efficiency of BBP, we propose a two-period delay commitment strategy. Our findings indicate that, under the framework of delay commitment, BBP can alleviate service competition, altering its impact on consumers while enhancing platform payoffs. Furthermore, the presence of asymmetry in base values between platforms prompts the platform with a higher base value commits to a superior service quality, thereby intensifying the influence of BBP and widening the quality gap between platforms, reminiscent of a Matthew effect. Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom that BBP always reduces social welfare because of inefficient consumer switching in the second period, we reveal that, somewhat surprisingly, overall social welfare can be improved by using BBP owing to its load-balancing effect in congestion systems. Managerial implications: In congestion-prone systems with endogenous delay decisions, BBP is shown to be detrimental for platforms.Nevertheless, our research underscores that implementing a delay commitment proves to be an effective strategy to restore BBP's efficiency. Both platforms are incentivized to adopt BBP when faced with substantial marginal capacity costs, and noteworthy enhancements in social welfare become achievable in the presence of a pronounced difference in base values between the platforms.

报告人简介：

王钟彬，天津大学英才副教授，国家优秀青年基金获得者。主要研究方向为随机服务运营，排队经济学。主持国家自然科学基金2项，中国科协青年人才托举工程项目1项。以第一作者或通讯作者在运筹学与管理科学国际顶级期刊OR, MS, MSOM, POM等发表多篇学术论文。相关学术成果曾获2022年“全国供应链与运营管理”最佳会议论文一等奖，2021年美国运筹学与管理学研究协会(INFORMS)服务科学最佳论文一等奖。